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INTRODUCTION
Interest in iconic communication has been constantly increasing over these past decades.  Not 
only as a point of theoretical interest in the field of semiotics, but as an efficient and simple way 
of communicating general information in everyday life.
In public places like airports, icons indicate directions or services. In printed form, like on 
product packages or instruction manuals, they provide detailed instructions in a synthetic way. 
On the internet “web sites”, they guide users of many different countries, who sometimes do not 
even share a writing system.
This rediscovering of the power of visual communication is not completely new1, but it has 
gained importance in the course of the century. In the middle of the 20s, the Austrian philosopher 
Otto Neurath began to promote the idea of instructing the masses by means of visual signs. His 
motto “Worte trennen, Bilder verbinden” (words divide, pictures unite) led him to propose the 
project  of  an  international  picture  language  named  ISOTYPE  (International  System  Of 
TYpographic Picture Education)2, which would become a sort of visual Esperanto. A follower of 
Neurath, Charles K. Bliss, proposed a more comprehensive (but less iconic) sign system in 1967 
(Semantography—actually in use, in a slightly derived form, for communication with speech-
disabled people), and a similar attempt (LoCoS) was made by the graphic designer Yukio Ota in 
1973 (Interestingly, the two were inspired, at least in the principle, by Chinese ideograms: it has 
been noticed for example that these allow a certain degree of mutual intelligibility of Chinese 
and Japanese written texts, although the language is not the same). Now these ambitious attempts 
to create  complete  visual  languages  of universal  diffusion have left  place to  very successful 
applications of iconic communication in more practical domains: public information, technical 
reference, man-machine interaction.
In order to better understand this relatively modern phenomenon, let us have a brief look over 
the recent context which has made it possible.
The Comeback of Icons
Let us first point out that icon, as a means of communication, is not an invention of our time; 
on the contrary, during long periods in history, it has been a privileged way to give information 
to a general public—which was much often illiterate3. In the course of West European Middle-
Ages, to mention but one of the best studied examples, at a time when religion was the most 
common  cultural  grounding,  but  when  the  language  of  the  Church  (latin)  had  become 
unintelligible to the masses, frescoes and stained-glass were used to “tell stories” from the Bible 
in a visual way. Even the newly invented printing press was used to that purpose, in what was 
called “emblem books”: in 1511, for example, the German artist Albrecht Dürer released a kleine  
Passion which was composed only of woodcut prints. Until the last century, also, the activities of 
shops  and  workshops  were  often  indicated  by  three-dimensional  signs,  like  a  boot  for  a 
shoemaker, a key for a locksmith, etc. (Dreyfuss, 1972: 38)
What gives us the impression that our time discovers the icon, when in fact it just rediscovers 
it, is that for a couple of centuries, written, alphabetic inscriptions had been able to stand out as a 
general way to convey messages, thanks to the growing literacy. We were then living in what 
McLuhan (1962) called the Gutenberg era.
Of course written messages can, in many ways, say more than icons or symbols; and in the 
absence of any standard, it may seem easier to write “no dumping” than to try to represent this 
message graphically. Yet the general understanding of written messages is only possible when 
the language used is agreed upon, and that means in a historical frame where three conditions are 
met: a unified language exists on a given territory (like at a national scale), most people are 
literate enough to understand this common language in its written form, and the movements of 
persons or information across boundaries are still scarce.
What had led to the development of writing was a change in the second condition; what leads, 
now, to a comeback of icons, is a change in the third condition. Many people move their houses 
and workplaces many times during their lives. Tourists and businessmen travel all around the 
world. Immigration flows have been increasing at an accelerated pace for four decades. Goods 
are bought and sold everywhere. And information travels instantaneously on television networks 
and on the internet. Icons are, so to say, an ultimate consequence of globalization.
What Makes an Icon Efficient
In this  globalized  context,  the most  important  concern for  people who design icons  is  to 
ensure that they will be understood by the greatest possible number among the addressed people.
Therefore, the institutions who want to promote the use of iconic signs on a rational basis are 
now  making  efforts  to  define  design  methodologies  and  efficiency  measurements.  A  very 
complete, and richly illustrated, panorama of the field of pictogram design has been given by Ota 
(1987)4.
Today, professionals involved in the development and evaluation of new visual languages—
graphic designers, semioticians and ergonoms—need a clear theoretical background to be able to 
understand why an icon will be efficiently recognized, by whom, and in which circumstances. 
They cannot only rely on intuition or obviousness to determine how reliably an icon will evoke 
an object or idea: they need both theoretical evidence, and experimental feedback.
In this paper, we are trying to think again about the main issues related to iconicity,  in a 
pragmatic  viewpoint;  namely:  how  should  the  old  methodological  objects  and  theories  be 
considered,  when the main issue about iconic  signs is their  recognizability.   This viewpoint 
quite admittedly restricts the object to an utilitarian perspective, and our experience lies mainly 
in  the  conception  of  information  pictograms.   We  do  not  claim  that  these  views  may 
undistinctively be extended to other iconic  signs in the broad sense (paintings,  photographs, 
cinema).  Yet we think it is useful to keep this self-admitted limitation in mind when thinking 
about  a  particular  iconic  genre:  it  will  help  us  avoid  the  pitfalls  of  overgeneralizations  and 
useless theoretical postulates.
So, we will try to give a concise and practical account of the three main theoretical issues 
concerning  icons:  how  much  has  an  icon  to  be  “like”  the  object  it  aims  at  representing? 
(Section 1), how far can—and should—an icon be free of cultural influences, to be understood 
by the most different people? (Section 2), and how much can icons be combined, internally or 
together, to form meanings? (Section 3).
We will then explain how, keeping these facts in mind, the design of icons for communication 
purposes  may  be  guided  to  ensure  maximal  recognizability  among  a  limited  population 
(Section 4).
1. THE QUESTION OF REALISM
What makes the icon so useful for communicating across the barriers of languages? It is the 
fact that the icon resembles its object. To understand a written word, one must know some given 
codes: first, the language used, and second, the writing system. To understand an icon, on the 
contrary, one would hopefully simply need to having already seen the object it represents—and 
thus be able to recognize its shape.
So  everybody  would  more  or  less  agree  to  this  fundamental  property  of  icons:  their 
resemblance to their objects. Yet there is much more to it than this simple resemblance. In fact, 
trying to ground a definition of the icon on this sole property, like Morris (1946) did, leads to an 
untenable theory: an icon is “all the more” iconic as it is essentially closer to its object. Morris 
wrote: “An iconic sign […] is any sign which is similar in some respects to what it denotes. 
Iconicity is thus a matter of degree.”  This point of view denies the icon the status of a semiotic 
object and makes it nothing but a more or less imperfect imitation of reality. It leads to what we 
could call the Cratylus paradox, after Plato’s dialog5.
On the contrary, the iconic sign, in functional uses, does not aim primarily at resembling its 
object as perfectly as possible. It aims at being recognized as quickly as possible by as many 
people as possible. And for this purpose, resemblance is an instrument, not a goal per se. It must 
in particular not be exaggerated: an efficient icon must be identifiable, but it must not display 
more  details  than necessary for  that;  otherwise it  would take more  time and attention  to be 
perceived.
Anyhow the most important question for an icon designer is actually: what should the icon try 
to reproduce? Is it really an object of the real world, like the first intuition suggests? Then if I 
want to transmit the meaning ‘house’, which house in particular should I use as a model? It is in 
fact not so easy to cut a well individualized object out of the real world continuum, and to make 
it embody a general concept.
What the iconic sign really reproduces is an iconic  type,  i.e.  a simplified and generalized 
visual representation of a concept, which may always be recognized through its different tokens. 
The type is, like the Groupe µ (1992) put it,  an “internalized and stabilized model”6, a form 
which has been built on the basis of visual perception. It is not a fully featured miniature of an 
object of the real world, it is a familiar shape. Figure 1 displays examples of such iconic types for 
man, car or house.
         
           
FIGURE 1: BASIC ICONIC TYPES
In cognitive psychology, these last decades, studies on categories have given evidence that the 
mind distinguishes a  basic level which is, in folk taxonomy, the natural level of categorization 
(e.g. “dog”, as opposed to “animal” [abstract], and to “retriever” [specialized]). This basic level 
is, according to Lakoff’s (1987: 46) summary:  “the highest level at which category members 
have similarly perceived overall shapes; the highest level at which a single mental image can 
reflect the entire category;  […] the level at which subjects are fastest at identifying category 
members […]”. Moreover, in many categories, as Rosch’s experiments show, some elements are 
judged to be more representative than others (e.g. robins are more representative of birds than 
ostriches or penguins): this is known as the prototype effect. These results give evidence about 
the cognitive status of iconic types. If we start from the notion that the “best” icons are those 
which are most easily recognized, then they also have to correspond to the visual aspect of these 
prototypical  objects.  Thus,  the  iconic  type  of  ‘man’  does  not  portray  a  specially  thin  nor  a 
specially large man; the ‘car’ is neither a racer nor a jeep; the ‘house’ is a typical square, two-
storeyed house.
Similarly,  the  iconic  type  implicitly  comes  with  canonical  elements  such  as  a  canonical 
position and perspective. For example, a snake is always represented sideways; a man, standing 
up with parallel legs, in front view; a horse, standing, in profile (Figure 2.a). Other positions look 
unusual and seem to connotate something more than the bare concept (Figure 2.b).
The middle icon in figure 2.a, for example,  used alone,  labels the generic concept “man”, 
whereas the middle icon in figure 2.b would inevitably suggest a “man, running” (actually, an 
icon very similar to this one is used, on road traffic signs in France, to indicate a relaxation 
area7). Only in a paradigm where it clearly stands in opposition to the shape of a man in motion, 
like in the pedestrian traffic lights at European crossroads, can the shape in figure 2.a come to 
mean something more than ‘man’ (in the example: ‘don’t cross the road’).
Likewise, the right icon in figure 2.a is generally simply understood as “a horse”, not as “a 
horse, standing, in profile”, since this position is assumed to be canonical8; on the contrary, the 
right icon in figure 2.b suggests “a dead horse”.
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FIGURE 2: CANONICAL POSITIONS IN ICONIC TYPES
Similarly, the iconic type is generally given with canonical relevant details. It is, for example, 
much more important to the recognition of the simple shape of a human face, to provide  eyes 
than to provide ears (Figure 3).
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FIGURE 3: CANONICAL RELEVANT DETAILS IN ICONIC TYPES
This canonicity of certain iconic types can be easily displayed by submitting the drawings in 
figures 2 and 3 to children for a recognition test.  The ‘a’ series prompts the simple answers 
“snake”,  “man”,  “horse”,  “face”  and “boat”,  when the  ‘b’  series  prompts  more  complicated 
explanations, like “face with big ears and no eyes”, provided the basic concept is still recognized.
Does the notion of type imply that the creation of a visual icon is nothing more than the 
copying of an already existing model? Not at all. A distinction must here be made between the 
act of reproducing an already existing visual model, and the act of founding a new model for an 
existing concept. These two distinct  situations fall  in the frames of what Eco (1975: § 3.4.9) 
calls ratio facilis and ratio difficilis. Eco (ibid., § 3.6.7) distinguishes what he calls an expressive 
type (tipo espressivo) and a semantic model (modello semantico, which is actually what we call, 
following [Groupe µ, 1992], the iconic type).
Producing a sign within a ratio facilis means creating a new token of a sign that has already 
been invented—for which the content/expression convention is already established. It is then the 
type on the expression side of the sign—the expressive type— which is reproduced. This is what 
we do when we use a letter in the latin alphabet, when we write a Chinese ideogram, but also 
when we take an already standardized  iconic  sign and simply make a new copy of  it.  This 
situation is of course of less interest to us, since the question of recognizability has, at this stage, 
already been solved. A sign produced in ratio facilis to an existing expressive type can obviously 
still be viewed as iconic, as long as it is still identified as such by its readers; but this feature has 
become so to say contingent, since the convention is already established. In this connection, it is 
very  interesting  to  notice  that  some  ideographic  systems  have  partially  evolved  from 
pictographic origins. This is the case for Chinese ideograms, Sumerian cuneiform ideograms or 
ancient  Egyptian  writings.  It  could  even  be  at  the  deepest  origin  of  our  modern  alphabetic 
writings9.
Producing a sign within a  ratio difficilis is inventing a new representation for an existing 
concept. This is what a graphic designer does when he makes a new drawing to represent a 
concept. In this situation, the person involved in producing the sign is really concerned in its 
being recognizable by any reader in the absence of a precise convention. This is when the iconic 
type is referred to. The iconic type does not consist in a fully specified model of the sign, which 
only needs to be instantiated (like the expressive type does): it is a visual abstraction, condensing 
the way we usually represent ourselves a given concept, with its most salient features and its 
most habitual perspective. It is a semiotic mediation between raw perception and the concepts.
If we make a correct  interpretation of this conception,  we are able to avoid two opposite 
pitfalls which semiotics has encountered in trying to define the very essential nature of iconicity: 
“the aporia  of a simple  theory of resemblance,  and the implausibility and rigidity  of a pure 
conventionalism”  (Blanke,  1999).  On  the  one  side,  the  Cratylus  paradox;  on  the  other,  the 
negation of any relation between the icon and the natural world, denounced as an illusion (this 
dogmatic conventionalism is expressed e.g. in (Greimas & Courtés, 1979). We can reasonably 
put aside the endless debates dragged by referentialist semantic theories, in assuming that iconic 
signs, like verbal signs in the Saussurean tradition, are linked to psychical objects, not to objects 
of the real world; and we can reject the objection that this leads to pure conventionalism, by 
acknowledging  that  this  psychical  object  is  originally  rooted  in  visual  perception—this  is 
developed in more detail in (Vaillant, 1999: § 3.4).
The notion of iconic  type  thus allows us to view the iconic  sign in  a  structural  semiotic 
perspective, as the union of a signifiant—the actual image—and of a signifié—the iconic type. 
As soon as this perspective is adopted, theoretical questions concerning the ontological status of 
the sign, of its  denotatum,  and of its  realism (considered as the nature of the relation to its 
denotatum), lose their importance. We take as given the ontological status of what we are trying 
to interpret or to produce: it is a sign, clearly identified as such. We take as granted that this sign 
has a  signifié which is not an object of a real world but a cultural representation (i.e. a shared 
conceptual  object):  the  iconic  type.  Hence,  the  question  which  is  now  of  interest  in  this 
perspective is how to determine most accurately this cultural representation.
2. THE QUESTION OF CULTURALITY
It is at the level of cultural semiotics that the problem of iconicity can now be formulated. The 
iconic type being a cultural representation, to which the iconic representation is conventionally 
linked, any difference of cultural context can entail differences in the representation. Moreover, 
when icon is beginning to be used as a language, it has to invent codes to be able to express 
something more than what it can flatly represent; and these codes are strongly related to their 
cultural environment.
2.1. Cultural determinism in iconic types
The first  level  at  which cultural  determinism can be observed is  the identification  of the 
concepts itself. Choosing to express a certain concept by mean of a sign, whatever the nature of 
this  sign,  involves  having  already  delimited  a  certain  amount  of  cognitive  experience  and 
identified it as a concept (a “thought-sign”). Cassirer (1923: Introduction, II) shows how crucial 
the development of language is for giving consciousness this ability to abstract concepts from 
ever  changing  experience;  this  ability  is  in  his  view  at  the  basis  of  abstract  thought  itself. 
Arnheim  (1969:  XIII)  argues  that  language  basically  provides  the  categories  that  form  the 
significant  units  in  iconic  signs.  He  also  tempers  the  theory  of  language’s  overdetermining 
conceptual thought by recalling that some categories may also find their roots in visual or motor 
experience. The influence of language on the segmentation of our experience is still a mighty 
cultural bias, since language in return affects the way we interact with the world (Whorf, 1962).
A case  of  cultural  variability  could  lie  exactly  there,  in  the  levels  which  given  cultures 
“choose” as being basic: “Berlin suggests that a given culture may underutilize certain human 
capacities used in basic-level  categorization,  for example,  the capacity for gestalt  perception. 
Thus, in urban cultures, people may treat the category tree as basic level.” (Lakoff, 1987).  The 
iconic  type  reflects  this  cognitive  shaping  of  categories:  it  is  formed  at  the  basic  level  of 
categorization.
The canonical perspective (figure 2) implicitly present in the iconic type is another example 
of  cultural  element;  it  is  not,  though,  very representative  of  cultural  determinism since  it  is 
mainly determined by questions of visibility and recognizability of the shape. If a bicycle, for 
example,  or  a  sombrero,  are  always  represented  sideways,  it  is  because they are  difficult  to 
picture in other perspectives (or it is done so on purpose, like in the “droodle” figure 4, to puzzle 
the reader and create a pictorial riddle). There is however some evidence that the cultural context 
may influence this  canonical  position,  even when no clear difference in recognizability is  at 
stake. The ancient Egyptians,  for example,  in their  hieroglyphs and in their  two-dimensional 
frescoes, would practically never represent a human being or an animal in frontal position.
FIGURE 4: DROODLE: CYCLIST WITH A LARGE SOMBRERO
A more obvious locus where cultural environment plays a prominent role, is in the canonical 
relevant details adopted implicitly in an iconic type to ensure identification of a concept. The 
judgement of typicality which is made on certain features depends on the natural and cultural 
Umwelt10.  A good example of this phenomenon is for example the two pictograms representing 
‘man’  and  ‘woman’  for  international  public  information  signals11 (figure  5).  They  can  be 
distinguished by the shape of the silhouette,  not based on morphological  differences,  but on 
traditional  clothes:  the  man  is  apparently  wearing  trousers,  the  woman  a  skirt.   No  other 
difference appear. This graphical opposition is of course entirely based on a culture where a 
clothing code clearly stipulates  trousers for men and skirts  for women.  In this,  it  is  already 
lagging a couple of decades behind our present cultural habits. What about its relevance for a 
society where this opposition does not exist? Let us compare with prehistoric rock paintings, 
where the representations of men and women would differ by salient anatomic details; or with 
ancient Egyptian paintings, where the distinction would mainly lay along the line: skirt (bare 
chest) for men vs. dress (covered chest) for women; or again with traditional Chinese painting, 
where both men and women wear ample gowns, but are mainly distinguished by the beard and 
hairstyle.
          
FIGURE 5: STANDARD ICONS FOR MAN AND WOMAN
In the same way, typical French people will tend to represent the concept “bread” in the form 
of a long loaf (baguettes being the most common presentation of bread in France), while the 
German will more likely picture it round. Many other such examples can be found, illustrating 
the fact that the way a given society impregnates and transforms its environment influences the 
iconic types it produces.
2.2. Other transcription conventions
We can then identify levels of cultural conventions which are not so directly linked to the 
processing of perception anymore.  They arise  when it  comes to represent,  in an iconic  sign 
system, phenomena which are not mappable to a two-dimensional spatial expression of relatively 
simple and distinct shapes. They form a set of “transcription codes” (Eco1968: § B.1) by which 
some inevitable arbitrariness comes mix into figurative representation.
Icons, and more generally fixed images, are in fact very efficient to express two-dimensional 
visual scenes, as long as they can represent spatial relations (on the plane of contents) by other 
spatial relations (on the plane of expression). As soon as they have to represent something which 
is not homogeneous to two-dimensional  spatial  relations,  or which does not fit  the technical 
constraints of the medium, they have to invent codes.
It is already so, for example, when it comes to represent a third dimension of space. There is 
no unique, “natural” way to represent depth or thickness in images. There are various possible 
techniques or conventions, called perspectives, generally based on the attempt to reproduce one 
of  the  factors  by  which  the  human  eye  perceives  depth  (today,  mainly:  superposed  planes, 
relative size, projected angles, shades; stereoscopic vision is still unpractical to implement). But 
modern perspective is not such an obvious, “natural” mode of representation, since it has only 
been invented in the Fifteenth Century, amidst the momentous cultural upheaval of the Italian 
Quattrocento (Panofsky,  1991).  It  is,  admittedly,  naturalistic but  this  naturalism  itself  is  a 
cultural convention, not the necessary tendency of any attempt at pictural representation12.
Many other visual phenomena, too, have sometimes to be expressed on a medium which does 
not have the possibility to express them by a simple projection. Light, for example, does not exist 
on a paper or street sign13,  these being lit  uniformly by ambient light.  In painting,  it  can be 
represented by a variation of color brightness.  But in a line drawing, a very common usage 
consists in representing light as radiating from its source through convergent strokes (figure 6.a. 
A discussion about this representation of a “folk” scientific abstraction can be found in [Eco, 
1968: § B.1.II.6]).
Particular  textures are  also  conventionally  represented  by  graphical  “tricks”.  Complex 
textures which can not be represented in their whole details, e.g. a tree’s foliage (figure 6.b), the 
surface of the sea, the rough skin of a rhinoceros, a grassy meadow… are often represented by a 
few curves sprinkled about the figure, designed to evoke the fractal complexity of the object.
          
FIGURE 6: EXAMPLES OF TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS
2.3. The level of symbols
Likewise,  any  attempt  to  represent  an  action,  i.e.  temporal  depth,  comes  up  against  a 
fundamental  contradiction with the statical  nature of the icon. Lessing (1766) arguments that 
when art tries to express nature, poetry is in a better position to express actions, and painting in a 
better position to express bodies and their visible properties; hence that when painting wants to 
suggest actions, it has to do so indirectly, by representing intermediate stages around which our 
mind will be able to rebuild the whole action14.
Iconic signs designers, in point of fact, have to face a choice when they have to represent 
anything which involves temporal development: either making use of several representations of 
the  same  referent  at  different  moments,  or  suggesting  the  actual  action  by  one  of  its  most 
illustrative stages. The first choice is not always possible to implement; it must be recognized as 
such (which is not always the case, as witness the reluctance that young children sometimes have 
at identifying a same character in two figures of the same comics page); and it also involves 
some arbitrary conventions (should the successive figures be visually separated, e.g. by squares 
or lines? in which direction should time progression go?) On the whole, the representation of 
different moments of action, by breaking the implicit postulate of image’s unicity, tends to add 
confusion for the interpreter of the image.
The second choice seems to be cleaner.  However it  raises a series of even more difficult 
problems. Even in the case of visually identifiable actions, it is difficult to choose the adequate 
phase to represent a whole process. Things get worse as one tries to represent more abstract 
concepts.  If  “raising hands” can be quite  evidently  drawn on paper,  the problem gets  more 
complex with “praying” or “surrendering” or “giving up”.
At this point, we may say that the real, intended signifié, has become distinct from the concept 
providing the iconic type. The visually recognizable representation now only points to the actual 
signifié through a metaphorical transposition.
This process is actually not only used for actions, but for all other occasions to represent non-
visual concepts. In all of these cases, the scene which is directly represented serves only as an 
indication  to  reconstitute  the  non-visual  meaning.  Here  the  iconic  sign  systems  do  not  do 
anything else than verbal language when it uses lexemes with a visual content to express abstract 
meanings  (to  run  into,  to  lay  down,  etc.):  there  is  still  an  iconic  relation  between  the 
representation  and the  iconic  type,  or  “first-degree”  signifié,  but  from then  on,  the  way the 
abstract  signifié is  evoked  rests  entirely  on  the  plane  of  contents:  it  connects  homogeneous 
entities  together  (visual  contents  and  abstract  contents;  see  figure 7).  In  Hjelmslevian 
terminology, we are here on the level of symbols, not on the level of signs (Hjelmslev, 1969: ch. 
21).
FIGURE 7: SYMBOLIC TRANSPOSITION OF THE ICONIC SIGNIFIÉ
Of course, it is on this level, that is to say beyond the icon, that cultural context exerts the 
strongest influence. The ways a graphical representation can resemble an iconic type are various, 
but still somehow constrained—at least technically—; whereas the ways a concrete concept may 
be used to symbolize an abstract concept are a priori not limited.
Commonly  mentioned  symbolic  relation  types  are  metonymy  or  metaphor  (these  terms 
borrowed to the vocabulary of rhetoric). In metonymy, the symbolic relation is grounded on an 
existential connection, for example when a typical tool is used to represent an activity (a trowel 
for masonry,  a pick for mining); in metaphor, it is grounded on a transposition on a different 
semantic  domain  (e.g.  an  eagle  used  to  represent  the  king  because  it  flies  high  over  other 
animals)15.
These types  of abstract  relationships are obviously highly dependant on the historical  and 
technical  background  of  a  society.  Iconic  languages,  in  this  respect,  share  the  cultural 
background which applies also to verbal language and other intellectual productions of any given 
human society: a web of common metaphors, of shared prejudices (topoi), of mental schemes 
(like the scripts and plans used in articicial intelligence), which form a sort of vast poly-semiotic 
intertextuality16. Any new cultural production is interpreted within the filtering patterns passed 
on by pre-existing cultural objects. Examples of clearly divergent symbolizations can be found, 
e.g.  the snake being used to represent treachery (the image comes from the Bible [Genesis 3, 1–
7]), when in other cultures snakes are symbols of divine power (like the Quetzalcoatl in Aztec 
cosmogony; or also in ancient Greece, where snakes are often signs or instruments of the Gods’ 
wills).
FIGURE 8: INTERNATIONAL ROAD TRAFFIC SYMBOL FOR DANGER
Even  for  very  common  signs,  used  in  everyday  life,  the  relative  abstractness  of  certain 
concepts has led to the development of graphical symbols which are not pictograms, but instead 
are based on some sort  of symbolization.  When these symbols are very widespread,  like the 
symbol  for  danger in highway code (figure 8), the original symbolic link is not consciously 
evoked anymore every time the symbol is perceived. Instead, they function like mere  signals, 
like Frutiger (1978) calls them, i.e. they are nearly reduced to bare stimuli.  Then the original 
symbolic relation may well have led to different signals in different countries. If we consider for 
example  the  signs  which  are  most  commonly  used  for  chemist’s  shop and  for  post  office 
respectively in France and in Germany, we can notice that they have nothing in common: the 
first is represented, in France, by a green cross (figure 9.a, left), and in Germany, by a Gothic A 
letter (standing for Apotheke, figure 9.b, left); the second is represented, in France, by a stylized 
bird (figure 9.a, right), and in Germany, by a hunting horn (a sign also widespread in Eastern 
Europe:  figure 9.b,  right).  Moreover,  neither  of  these  has  anything  in  common  with  more 
“international” attempts to represent the concepts as pictograms (generally based on the drawing 
of a phial for the chemist’s shop, and on the drawing of a letter or postcard for the post office). 
Yet these four nearly arbitrary symbols perform better than any others at recognition tests; and 
even if they are sometimes completed by more international symbols, like the caduceus, in their 
biggest models, they are still mostly used alone in their respective countries.
a. in France                     
b. in  
Germany                     
FIGURE 9: GRAPHICAL SYMBOLS USED FOR “CHEMIST’S SHOP” AND FOR “POST OFFICE”
If  even  on  practical  examples,  we  face  so  much  difficulty  in  getting  hold  of  a  simple, 
universal graphical representation, it is all the more difficult when it comes to represent abstract 
concepts or actions. It becomes clear that this problem is the big stumbling block of pictogram 
design, since on this point, graphic designers are left with their intuition alone. This may also 
possibly explain  why attempts  to  define  comprehensive  universal  iconic  languages  (like  the 
above-mentioned Semantography or LoCoS) fail to meet a wider acceptance: however they try, 
they cannot create really universal symbols for abstract concepts, especially for verbs.
2.4. Temporal or spatial shift
Lastly, it should be kept in mind, when trying to distinguish between the practical notions of 
resemblance and recognizability,  that icons, like any cultural objects, are emitted in a certain 
society, at a certain historical moment, and that changes of this extended context may lead to 
some loss of understandability of some of their features.
The relevance of a criterion of historical adequacy is challenged when for instance, Dürer 
represents the Roman soldiers guarding the Holy Cross dressed like the Middle-Age soldiers he 
was used to see in XVIth century Europe.  Yet it may have been, in Dürer’s time, the shortest 
way to convey the interpretation /soldier/, to the “visual” readers his paintings were designed for.
In the other way round, when icons, on information signs, picture the concept “telephone” 
with an old swivel dial; or when traffic signs use the drawing of an old steam-powered train for 
level  crossings;  the  question  is  no  more  that  of  representing  objects  of  the  past  with 
contemporary visual  referents,  but  that  of  representing contemporary objects  with old visual 
referents.
It seems that in many cases, a visual type which factually is no more accurate vis-à-vis its 
present  referent,  is  used  because  it  leads  to  a  better  recognizability  than  a  modernized 
representation would.
Does this challenge the iconicity of such signs?  Not really, since the type actually still bears a 
link with a world of visual perceptions belonging to the iconic semiotic  field  (paintings  and 
drawings of old trains, old films where private detectives use old telephone dials...) This simply 
shows that visual types that have emerged in precise historical contexts (in our examples, in the 
first decades after the spreading of telephones and trains in everyday life), have managed to stand 
out as pregnant identifiers, which now actually “work” better at signifying their referent than a 
more up-to-date representation.
By anchoring visual signs in diachronicity,  this fact indirectly witnesses the very semiotic 
nature  of  those  signs.   They are  subject  to  the  fundamental  laws  of  sign  systems,  and  this 
includes a temporal “lifetime”.
In (Vaillant, 1999: § I.9) we proposed a model for the evolution of visual signs, where four 
stages  can  be  roughly  isolated  from a  temporal  continuum:  (1)  a  code  setting  stage,  where 
pictural representations still try to more or less accurately represent the physical objects; (2) a 
code freezing stage, where the canonical representation sets down to become a fixed model; (3) a 
contemporary  stage,  where  the  code  is  already  fixed  (ratio  facilis paradigm),  but  the 
representation is still “felt” (by its readers) to be iconical; (4) a final phase, where the feeling of 
iconicity has been lost, due to the combined evolutions of the signifiant and of the signifié: this is 
e.g. the case with Chinese characters which were originally pictograms, but which now function 
as mere writing signs.
Distance in space may somehow affect the interpretation of a sign in the same way as distance 
in time does.  This was particularly true at a time when there was not so much communication 
between countries and cultures as there is now.  Today it is not uncommon to see signs which 
have  an  iconic  origin  in  one  part  of  the  world  spread  out  in  other  places,  where  they  are 
irrelevant  to  the  local  equivalents  of  the  original  referent.   This  holds  as  well  for  the 
“trousers/dress” opposition  seen in  fig. 5—where  the  model  is  a  fossilized  stereotype  of  the 
western civilization—, as for lots of icons designed for computer systems, where the referent is 
clearly and more specifically North-American.
FIGURE 10: END OF RESIDENTIAL AREA (PHOTO TAKEN IN JORDAN BY MFC)
At present we are in a paradoxical situation where the cultural types travel faster than their 
actual referents, like the photograph in figure 10 witnesses: it is a standard “end of residential 
area” sign, like many may be found in Western Europe, picturing children playing outside a 
traditional bricks house, near a pavement; but the photograph has been taken in the desert in 
Jordan, and the residential area actually was a tents village!
3. THE QUESTION OF ARTICULATION
3.1. Internal articulation in iconic signs
A  visual  sign  always  displays  internal  elements.   It  is  actually  the  very  presence  and 
configuration of the internal elements which allow the sign to be recognized.  As displayed in the 
examples  on  figure 3,  some  elements  have  a  specific  importance  because  they  are  “more” 
characteristic of the type;  if they fail,  the type fails  to be recognized;  if they are there,  it  is 
recognized.
Figure 11  shows  an  example  of  such  internal  elements.   In  figure 11.a,  the  very  simple 
combination of elements is spontaneously interpreted as a human face.  Figures 11.b, 11.c, and 
11.d show that the internal components are not themselves characteristic of the type: the circle 
alone, or the smaller arc of circle alone, or the dots alone, are not enough to signify the visual 
signifié /face/. Only a precise spatial combination of all of them triggers this interpretation.
FIGURE 11: INTERNAL ELEMENTS TO RECOGNIZE THE SIMPLEST VISUAL TYPE “FACE”
But there is more in visual signs than simply smaller elements whose function is to allow the 
sign to be recognized.  This definition could also hold for the phonemes in spoken language, or 
for the graphemes in written language.  In the English spoken word /fεıs/, for instance, it could 
also be said that not /f/ alone, nor /εı/ alone, nor /s/ alone, determines the meaning “face”, but 
only the combination of those three elements (face ≠ fate ≠ bait ≠ bite, etc.), and in that specific 
order  (face  ≠  safe).   However,  in  the  examples  from spoken  language,  those  characteristic 
elements have no meaning by themselves, even when dipped in the context of a word.  Instead, 
in the iconic sign, when the two dots of figure 11.d, the arc of circle in figure 11.c, and the circle 
in figure 11.b are put together in a certain order, they not only have a distinctive function but 
they also are visually interpreted as eyes, mouth, and face contour respectively.
In  the  iconic  sign,  there  is  a  phenomenon  of  what  Sonesson  (1989:  299)  calls 
“resemanticization”.   The  dot,  a  tiny detail  in  itself,  is  resemanticized  in  the context  of  the 
configuration in figure 11.a to be interpreted as an eye.
This resemanticization is nothing different than a strong influence of the (global) context on 
the (local) element.  It is widely acknowledged that this type of influence exists in every semiotic 
system,  including  natural  languages.   Even if  a  “compositional”  conception  of  meaning  has 
remained in the mainstream of linguistic theories, every linguist would agree that the word rat, 
for instance, has a different value in the context of a zoology book and in a gangsters movie—yet 
being exactly the same word, not a homophone.  The position that this influence of the whole on 
the part has to have in a linguistic semantic theory is debated: some still think that the question 
concerns a set  of peripherical  facts.  However, the comprehensiveness and consistency of the 
compositional  theory  of  meaning  generally  is  proven  true  within  a  fixed  set  of  examples 
cautiously selected by the linguists—hence it seems a reasonable empirical caution to assume 
that unless proven otherwise, any context exerts some sort of influence on the meaning of any 
sign. This bidirectional theory of meaning, where texts give meaning to words as much as words 
give  meaning  to  texts,  fits  with  systemic  thought,  and  is  now  defended  by  some 
linguists (Rastier, 1987): it assumes that the interpretation of any text follows the principle of 
hermeneutic circle.
It is no wonder if this conception of the construction of meaning, going downwards as well as 
upwards, works even better in the visual world than in the linguistic world.  Context has an even 
stronger influence in the case of iconic signs.  Going back to the “face” example, if small crosses 
replace  dots,  at  the  same  position  in  the  spatial  configuration,  they  are  still  interpreted  as 
“eyes” (figure 12).
FIGURE 12: CROSSES AND SPIRALS RESEMANTICIZED INTO EYES
This  type  of  phenomena  has  been  studied  in  detail  by  the  Gestalt  psychologists,  who 
explained them in terms of shape perception.  To the question: “why do things look as they do?”, 
Koffka (1935: 98) answers: “things look as they do because of the field organization to which the 
proximal stimulus distribution gives rise.”  In other words: what the human perception first sees 
is the overall shape of a face, and the interpretation of one element as a mouth, and of another 
element as an eye, comes afterwards, as a consequence.
So, the smaller elements in iconic signs have quite a different status in the visual semiotic 
system than the phonemes in the verbal semiotic system.  If both can be said to contribute to the 
global meaning by defining a meaningful configuration, the visual elements charge themselves 
with part of the meaning (eyes, mouth, etc.), when the phonemes, on the contrary, stay below the 
semiotic threshold.  The smaller elements in an iconic sign are signs themselves.
In orthodox structuralist terminology, if signs are decomposable into smaller signs, then they 
are not only signs, but texts.  So the best parallel with verbal language could actually be found at 
the level of texts: an icon is a text, made up of smaller signifying elements, which are signs—just 
as a text in a human language is made up of words and morphemes.
This conception implies that the type of dependencies between parts of expression which may 
be found in visual signs stays at the level of languages’s  first articulation (decomposition of 
syntagms into signs), not at the level of its  second articulation (decomposition of signs into 
figures).  This obviously challenges the attempts to project the notion of double articulation, 
which had been developed for linguistic systems, on visual semiotics.  The very notion of double 
articulation implies that there is a clear threshold where units of meaning cease being linked to 
units of expression; such a threshold will obviously not be found, at least not in a way that can be 
generalized, in visual semiotics.
Eco (1975:  § 3.5.9)  has  given  up  his  earlier  attempts  to  decompose  the  visual  semiotic 
systems into articulation levels, to state that the “so-called ‘iconic signs’ [should be regarded as] 
(a) VISIBLE TEXTS, which (b) are NOT FURTHER ANALYSABLE neither into signs nor into figures”—yet he 
admits the existence of smaller signifying units in those visual texts, so why not call them signs?
In previous works (Vaillant, 1999: ch. 3), we have proposed a model of double articulation 
specific to some visual sign systems, and argued that such a double articulation model could be 
found in any particular visual sign system (as long as it is not confused with a generic double 
articulation  model  for  all  visual  signs),  since  any  visual  text  could  obviously  be  physically 
decomposed into elementary units of perception on the expression plane (colour stains, pixels, 
photograph grains, etc.)  But we had assumed that any atomic unit of perception may be called a 
semiotic  unit,  which  actually  does  not  have  much  meaning  when these  units  are  below the 
threshold of perception as individual units—so we would now more simply say that there is no 
such thing as double articulation in visual signs, in general.
A more  modest  conception  of  iconic  visual  texts  as  systems  is  to  view them as  biplane 
semiotic  systems,  decomposable  in signs, and where every unit  at  any level  on the plane of 
expression still has a corresponding unit on the plane of contents.
In a doubly articulated semiotic system like language, the source of meaning is the second 
articulation: some elementary units under the meaning threshold (phonemes, graphemes) form 
certain combinations which allow some portions of the text to become “mnemonic keys” giving 
access to items in a lexicon—i.e. given primary sets of semantic units; when some elements are 
given, the whole text is then interpreted by a process of hermeneutic circle, eventually assigning 
a stable meaning to the whole and to every one of its part.
In a semiotic system like the iconic visual text, where only one homogeneous type of relation 
among parts exist at every level (one single articulation),  the source of meaning must reside 
somewhere.  It seems adequate to say that it resides in the pregnant forms, i.e. those basic visual 
configurations  which  have  been  learned  by  our  visual  perception  system  primary  to  any 
semioticization: regular geometric forms, very common forms in the world of experience (human 
faces, etc.)  These forms are the  Gestalten that Gestalt psychologists have shown to be at the 
basis of our field perception of visual stimuli.
In  this  conception  of  visual  texts,  some pregnant  forms  are  perceived  prior  to  any other 
higher-level configurations, or tinier details; and after meaning has been assigned to those forms, 
the whole image is interpreted in a process of hermeneutic circle, just like for linguistic texts (or 
even:  much  more  than  for  linguistic  texts),  by  putting  these  forms  into  context  in  broader 
configurations, in an upward perception movement; and by “resemanticizing” tinier details, in a 
downward movement.
This is our interpretation of what Eco (1998) calls the Alpha and Beta modalities of semiosis: 
the Alpha modality, in Eco’s terms, corresponds to the perception of forms by the basic level of 
visual perception (without triggering the semiotic interpretation system), and the Beta modality 
corresponds to our faculty of semiotic interpretation.
3.2. Non-iconic relations inside iconic texts
Having admitted that icons can be viewed as texts, of course it still seems somehow strange to 
compare a linguistic sequence such as “rounded face contour, eyes above, mouth below” to a 
small  icon like the one in figure 11.a.  But this is very simply explained by the facility with 
which visual  texts  are  equipped to represent  bidimensional  spatial  relations  (on the plane of 
contents)  by bidimensional  spatial  relations  (on  the  plane  of  expression).  However,  when it 
comes to represent other types of semantic relations than spatial relations, icons may make use of 
the same type of devices as language does, like implicit knowledge, predication, or metaphor.
This may be seen in many examples, starting with the most common pictographic signs used 
on public  information signs,  on machine commands,  or in software graphical  user interfaces 
(GUI).  The pictogram on figure 13, for example, does not say “this is a broken glass”, it says: 
“danger: fragile object”.  There is an implicit causative in the message; the reader is invited to 
“reconstruct” the process leading to a broken glass, and to infer the indication of a type of risk. 
The sign in fig. 10, which we have used as an example before, does not mean “car, house, man, 
leaning boy, ball, red line”, it means “not in a residential area [anymore]”.  Its interpretation 
supposes to understand the implications  leaning boy +  ball → playing children; then  house + 
strolling man + playing children → residential area; then residential area + red line → leaving 
a residential area.
FIGURE 13: GRAPHICAL SYMBOL FOR “DANGER: FRAGILE OBJECT”
However, experiments have shown that such “assembled” pictograms, representing semantic 
relations of a type other than spatial,  are not so easily understood by subjects as plain icons. 
Bordon’s study (2003) for instance showed that pictograms like those presented in figure 14.a, 
figure 14.b, and figure 14.c,  meaning “hand wash”, “danger: corrosive” and “non-toxic plastic: 
suitable for food”, respectively, were misinterpreted by a significant number of subjects  (8/14, 
2/14 and 14/14  respectively),  in  the  absence  of  a  very strong determination  by the  external 
context.  And a pictogram like the one shown in figure 14.d, meaning “recyclable steel”—the 
interpretation of which calls to a great part of implicit knowledge (steel is magnetic, and steel is 
recyclable)—was nearly not understood altogether, even with a non-ambiguous context.
          
a. hand wash           
b. danger: 
corrosive
  
          
c. non-toxic plastic: suitable for  
food           d. recyclable steel
FIGURE 14: SOME GRAPHICAL SYMBOLS IN BORDON’S STUDY
These experimental clues tend to confirm a conclusion that the theory of articulation in iconic 
texts presented above (Section 3.1) naturally implied: if the first movement of the semiosis of 
icons resides in the recognition of primitive forms, then any additional internal complexity will 
tend to add to the recognition time; and this all the more so when the internal complexity breaks 
with the spatiality of “genuine” icons to insert some other types of semantic relations between 
iconic elements.
3.3. Combination of pictograms
We have no reason to think that what holds below the level of the iconic sign does not hold 
above that level.  To begin with, we do not even have a good reason to think that there is a clear 
level at which the iconic sign can be delimited and identified as such, since, as we have argued in 
Section 3.1, (a) there is no double articulation, in general, in iconic sign systems, and (b) iconic 
signs are indeed iconic texts.
In a fresco painting, for instance, there are many iconic signs at different levels (a table, a loaf 
of bread, an apostle, the hand of an apostle...), and yet the only clear level at which a limit can be 
drawn is the whole fresco itself.
Yet, if we talk about pictograms rather than about iconic signs, we are in a more specialized 
perspective, and there is a tradition, in the modern use of the word, to delimit pictograms by a 
clear outline.
If a frontier is drawn between a dimension which is internal to the figure, and a dimension 
which  is  external  to  the  figure,  then  there  is  a  possibility  to  delimit  where  the  iconic 
interpretation should stop, and where another type of syntagmatic relations may begin.  This is 
all  the more feasible when the internal  space and the external  space17 do not have the same 
topological properties.  For instance, if the pictograms in a given sign system are monochrome 
drawings in two dimensions,  and if the possible combinations of more than one of them are 
always arranged in a line, then the internal space is a bidimensional space, and the external space 
is a unidimensional one.
The Japanese school of pictographic design (Katzumie, Ota) has set up a distinction between 
絵文字 (Emoji) and 絵ことば  (Ekotoba), which goes along this line.  The Emoji is an iconic 
visual sign, and the  Ekotoba is an iconic visual syntagm (Ota, 1987: 20).  An example is the 
disposition of two signs, one meaning “toilets”, and the other “left direction”, to form a message 
which should be interpreted “the toilets are on your left”.
This type of distinction is of course interesting for those iconic sign systems which draw a 
distinction between an internal space and an external space, like e.g. the information pictograms, 
or comic strips.  As soon as the frontier of the figure inhibits the iconic interpretation of spatial 
relations, a disposition of figures becomes a syntagm, which should be interpreted—however in 
a limited fashion, because of the absence of a fixed grammar—like the sentence of any linguistic 
natural language.
4. TOWARDS A PRAGMATIC VALIDATION METHODOLOGY
From the theoretical evidence exposed above, we have learned to consider that icons are not a 
passive reflection of some idealized reality, but that they are cultural artifacts which have to be 
actively  designed with a given purpose. In particular, when the purpose is to ensure maximal 
recognizability in a given usage context, we have shown that the ideal of “likeness” to the object 
is far less relevant than the possibility to identify a given schematic type.
To guide the icon designer in such contexts, it  is useful to have a design methodology in 
mind.  The basic principle underlying the whole methodology,  as in any social inquiry,  is to 
check the validity of the models against the reality of the concerned people.
A  guidebook  was  written  by  the  TC 145,  the  Technical  Comittee  of  the  International   
Organization for Standardization (ISO) responsible for standardization in the field of graphical 
symbols (ISO/TR 7239). Its purpose is to provide guidelines at every point of the development 
cycle of a new pictogram, from before the decision to use one (would it not be easier to build 
barriers around a dangerous site than to display a pictogram saying “danger”?), to the moment 
when the sign should be installed and validated.
The best complete source of information in this domain is that guidebook. It is designed to be 
used by big organizations with money to conduct surveys, and time to poll lots of participants; so 
it might not be practically implementable, in every aspect, by every graphic designer having to 
fulfill a private contract.  However, the essential stages it advises to go through are useful at any 
scale, and they correspond to the pragmatic semiotic methodology we are interested in.  They 
mainly  consist  in:  (1) a  bottom-up  collecting  process,  allowing  various  unconstrained 
propositions  for iconically representing a given message to emerge;  (2) a top-down selecting 
process, allowing a sample public to choose which of the propositions is  best  adapted;  (3) a 
validation process, measuring the recognizability of the representation which has stood out at 
step (2), and verifying that it fits the optional security margin for minimal recognizability.
In the following lines, we will describe how these general principles have been implemented 
on smaller-scale experiments that have been conducted among 44 eighth-class and 28 ninth-class 
(in France:  classe de quatrième and  classe de troisième) school children in Mantes-la-Jolie (a 
Parisian suburb) in 1995 and 1996; and among 42 educated colleagues  working in  a CNRS 
research team (LIMSI) in 1995.
4.1. Bottom-up collecting process
The  goal  of  the  first  stage  of  the  experiment  is  to  let  every  subject  assign  a  likely 
representation, or a set of likely representations, to a given message among a set of messages. 
The set of messages is the contents part, somehow the signifiés of the icon system.  They never 
form a complete  semiotic  system like a natural  linguistic  system,  though, so their  meanings 
contents is itself expressed by a paraphrase in natural language.
ISO/TR 7239 recommends to look for candidate pictograms among those which may already 
be in use, in a pre-standardized phase, in a given population, or to make a public competition 
announcement and to ask for professional graphic designers to tender their propositions.  In our 
type  of  experiment,  we  simply  ask  the  subjects  to  make  a  drawing  which  they  think  will 
adequately represent a given message.  To make the results of this first stage more suitable to go 
through material  reproducing constraints,  it  may be precised to the subjects  that  the drawing 
should be a black line drawing, making use of simple types of contours.
The work of the analyst, after having collected such an image corpus, is to be able to segment 
every drawing in small characteristic elements.  This may require a part of subjective expertise 
(although the units are generally clear-cut enough in a line drawing).  Then, a list of all occurring 
elements is made, and the most frequently recurring ones are identified.
At that stage, the table of co-occurring iconic elements is examined. For example, figure 15 
displays a sample of twelve18 drawings made by school children when asked to represent a fire 
engine.  It  appears  that  the  ladder,  the flashing light  and  the  fire  hose are  fairly  widespread 
distinctive elements in the iconic type of the fire engine.
If some of the elements tend to co-occur in similar configurations, they probably form an 
iconic syntagm and should appear together in one of the type variants submitted at step (2).  If 
two elements, on the other hand, generally never co-occur but appear in turn at some position in 
a configuration, then they probably are part of a paradigm, i.e. they are two variants for a given 
unit in the iconic text. Paradigms may be identified at the most elementary level, as well as at the 
iconic syntagm level—up to the whole type itself.  If there is a paradigm with more than one 
element, then there are more than one candidate type variants.
Talking about one single variant, the set of the most frequently occurring elements, and the 
configuration that they build, is a profile of the average iconic type that resides in the minds of 
the people  of  the given sample.   We regard it,  with  all  due methodological  caution,  as  the 
expression of an object belonging to a social semiotic layer.
FIGURE 15: 12 FIRE ENGINES BY EIGHTH-CLASS PUPILS IN MANTES-LA-JOLIE
4.2. Top-down selecting process, and validation
The second step in the methodology consists in submitting candidate iconic types to a pool of 
subjects, and to ask them what is the message they perceive.  If the number of answers that 
correspond to the expected answer is above a certain threshold, it can be assumed that the iconic 
type is recognized.
Again, there are no physical constants here but only empirical data and arbitrary decisions.  In 
our study, we had decided that an icon would be validated if no more than three subjects (i.e. one 
fourteenth of the sample of 42 people: 7%) failed to provide the expected answer.  But in certain 
security-sensitive contexts (for example,  pictograms giving indications about safety measures 
when handling toxic products),  the misunderstanding threshold may be set  even lower (until 
0%).
4.3. Locality
To  ensure  the  best  and  quickest  possible  recognizability,  the  question  of  the  targeted 
population has to be taken into account even before the level of icon design. As we have seen, 
culturality is inherent to any semiotic representation, even pictographic.  It is therefore important 
to involve this parameter into the icon design process from the beginning on: when controlled, 
culturality biases might be regarded as positive data used to cast signs as relevant as possible.
In a survey of the type we describe, results from the selected population reveal nothing more 
than trends of that very same population.  Like in linguistic surveys, where the rules abstracted 
from a corpus, ideally, describe nothing more than the corpus itself, generalization may be done 
only with much caution.  So, a conclusion of such a study on a given population P should not be 
stated as “this visual sign is a good iconic representation of that message”, but “this visual sign is 
confidently perceived as a representation of that message by the population P”.
If the goal of the study is to define a graphical representation valid exactly for the population 
P, or for a broader population of which P may be assumed to be a representative sample, then 
there is nothing to change from the conclusion to the actual use.  If, on the other hand, it is 
envisioned to extend the results of the study to quite a broader population, then it cannot be done 
by simply disregarding the local bias. Either a broader sample should be found: a new sample 
which would be representative of the broader population—or, if this is not feasible, the expert 
should try to identify what seems culturally biased in the results; and if she or he decides to 
modify something to compensate for that bias, state it explicitly and with a motivation, since this 
compensation is unavoidably subjective.
As an example, in the results of our study, it appeared that the most “successful” graphical 
representation for a post office in the samples (composed of French people or French residents) 
was the icon of a house with the “La Poste” logotype in it (see figure 9.a).  If the goal had been 
to use the symbol among an exclusively French public, then this type should have been adopted 
without hesitation, since it had the best score.  But in the present case, the goal is to use the 
symbol on public information booths meant to be used by tourists who may come from anywhere 
in  the world.   The expert  here  has to  be aware that  the “La Poste”  logo is  not  a universal 
representation, and may propose something hopefully more useful for a general public (like a 
house with a small envelope in it).  The resulting pictogram might be slightly less efficient for 
the French public, but it will be far more broadly recognizable.
Again, the important point here is to be empirical as much as possible, and, when it comes to 
take subjective decisions, to be conscious of their subjectivity.
CONCLUSION
Our view of iconicity is much more a practical perspective than a theory of the iconic sign; as 
we have written earlier (Bordon & Vaillant, 2001), for applied purposes, theories are good as far 
as they give a useful insight of the object; and in the real world, it is a better choice to be finicky 
with data and relaxed with theory than the other way round.
Yet it seems to us that  taking this practical  perspective as a starting point has allowed to 
develop useful conceptions of iconic sign systems, which may have an extended validity for the 
semiotics  of  graphical  communication,  and  reconcile,  in  this  field,  different  theoretical 
standpoints.
The essential conclusion of our work in the frame of the debate on iconicity would be that by 
(a) locating the primal source of visual texts semiosis in Gestalt perception, and (b) showing that 
the  interpretation  of  articulated  texts,  after  that  primal  movement,  follows  a  principle  of 
structuration in syntagms similar in its fundamentals to the one which governs the interpretation 
of written texts (despite the difference in semiotic dimension); we are actually remaining in the 
structuralist (non-referentialist)  tradition, and at the same time we are giving a ground to the 
specificity of iconic signs.
As a matter of fact, Gestalt perception actually is common to the vision of reality and to the 
vision of iconic semiotic artifacts (which distinguishes them from the so-called arbitrary signs); 
but the semiotic artifacts are then subject to the general principles of human sign systems, and in 
our  view this  suppresses  any temptation  to  see immanence  in  icons,  and to  get  involved in 
questions concerning the status of the referent.
On the practical ground, this view of iconicity leads to giving an essential status to the notion 
of  iconic  type,  which  fundamentally  is  a  social  representation,  like  the saussurean  linguistic 
signifié, instead of giving importance to the referent.  This iconic type should then, in this view, 
be studied like a social object, by empirical surveys.
NOTES
1. Even if  some graphic  design firms’  publicity give the  impression that  everything,  from the 
principle of drawing itself, has been freshly discovered in 1994.
2. A collection  of  drawings  made  for  ISOTYPE by the  graphic  designer  Ger  Arntz  has  been 
published in (Arntz, 1979). They have mostly been used for the presentation of statistical data. 
A history and explanation of Neurath’s ideals and project can be found at (Hartmann, 1998).
3. The noble filiation of Egyptian hieroglyphs is  one that  many would be proud to claim;  but 
hieroglyphs were made for a caste of initiates, which is precisely what modern icons do  not 
want to be.
4. Complete technical specifications are of course to be found in documents published by the ISO 
(International  Standards Organization) or  its  national  members  (ANSI,  AFNOR, BSC, DIN, 
JIS...), like ISO/TR 7239. The relevant standards for pictograms are ISO 7000 and ISO 7001.
5. In Cratylus, Socrates demonstrates the absurdity of demanding that the sign should be like its 
object, through the following paradox: if some God created a representation of Cratylus which 
would possess all of Cratylus’ properties, including warmth and softness, then would there be 
Cratylus  and  an  image  of  Cratylus,  or  two  Cratyluses?  He  concludes  that  “the  image,  if 
expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image”.
6. “Il s’agit d’un modèle intériorisé et stabilisé qui, confronté avec le produit de la perception, est  
à la base du processus cognitif.” (Groupe µ, 1992: 137). It should be noted that the authors in 
the Groupe µ still postulate the existence of a referent, with a role distinct from the type: the 
referent being a particular object of the real world, used as a model for the icon. We do not 
consider this notion as being necessary, since the relation between the icon and the perceptual 
reality is already present, though indirectly, in the type (the type finds its origins in the visual 
perception, through an abstraction process) (Vaillant, 1999: ch. 1).
7. AFNOR NF P 98-542-1 Standard, 1995.
8. Eco (1968:  § B.3.I.1)  expresses the idea that  “anche la piú rozza silhouette di  cavallo  non 
corrisponde  al  solo  segno verbale  ‘cavallo’  ma a una serie  di  possibili  sintagmi  del  tipo:  
‘cavallo in piedi di profilo’ […]” (even the roughest silhouette of a horse does not correspond to 
the mere verbal sign ‘horse’, but to a series of possible phrases of the type: ‘horse, standing, in 
profile’ […]). We think that on the contrary, in a minimal context (the reader is trying to reach 
an immediate  visual  recognition,  not  to  interpret  a  painting of  David representing Emperor 
Napoleon’s triumph), a silhouette of a ‘horse, standing, in profile’, evokes nothing more than a 
horse.
9. The early Phoenician alphabet, which has given birth to most of the important writing systems 
in  use  today  (Arabic,  Hebrew,  Greek  and  its  descendants:  Latin  and  Cyrillic)  may  have 
originally consisted of drawings representing words used only for their first letters.
10. Eco  (1968:  § B.1.II.5)  illustrates  this  by  an  interesting  Gedankenexperiment:  in  an  African 
community where the only known quadrupeds would be the zebra and the hyena, and where 
horses,  asses  and  mules  would  be  unknown,  it  would  be  more  important,  in  the  graphical 
representation of zebras, to insist on the shape of the muzzle and on the length of the legs, than 
to draw stripes. We are not totally convinced by Eco’s unverified hypothesis, since it is likely 
that such a “naturally” salient feature as the black and white stripes would probably have to be 
part of an iconic type anyway (the cats’ pointed ears are always present in drawings of cats, 
even if they are not particularly characteristic of the specy). The argument is however consistent 
and illustrates the logic of the feature selection process.
11. A model of which is given in the ISO 7001 Standard, 1990.
12. Not only about perspective, but in general, must “naturalistic” be distinguished from “natural”. 
Naturalism can be a feature of some genres in given cultural contexts. It aims at reinforcing the 
impression  of  presence  to  reality  (what  Greimas  and  Courtés  [1979]  call  “illusion 
référentielle”).  It  can be applied to different kinds of arts,  including non-visual,  although in 
those it obviously has to use different paths. Even in prehistory have “abstract” representations 
often  preceded  “naturalistic”  ones,  like  studies  on  religious  art  in  the  Paleolithic  (Leroi-
Gourhan, 1964) and Neolithic (Gimbutas, 1982) ages showed.
13. Unless it is rear lit, in which case light might become a metaphor of itself.
14. “Alle Körper existieren nicht allein in dem Raume, sondern auch in der Zeit. Sie dauern fort,  
und können in jedem Augenblicke ihrer Dauer anders erscheinen, und in anderer Verbindung  
stehen. Jede dieser augenblicklichen Erscheinungen und Verbindungen ist die Wirkung einer  
vorhergehenden, und kann die Ursache einer folgenden, und sonach gleichsam das Zentrum 
einer  Handlung  sein.  Folglich  kann  die  Malerei  auch  Handlungen  nachahmen,  aber  nur  
andeutungsweise durch Körper.”, (Lessing, 1766: § XVI).  For some of the shrewd studies on 
posters collected in L’image manipulée, Fresnault-Deruelle (1983: § IV, V) is led to the same 
type of observations: “D’une façon générale tout l’art des images uniques à vocation narrative  
consiste  à  distribuer  lisiblement  des  indices  rétrospectifs  ou,  au  contraire,  avant-coureurs  
d’une action posée comme un référent lacunaire à reconstituer […]”.
15. A far richer taxonomy of such types of figures is quoted in (Eco, 1993: ch. VII). It comes from a 
16th century treaty, Thesaurus artificiosæ memoriæ from Cosma Rosselli, and lists the types of 
ways in which a thing can be used to represent another (“quomodo multis modis, aliqua res  
alteri sit similis”).
16. The global conception of intertextuality primarily proposed by Barthes (1968) can in our view 
be extended to other semiotic systems.
17. The notions of internal and external space are developed in our glossary of semiotics, available 
(in French) at the address: http://www.vaillant.nom.fr/pascal/glossaire.html.
18. 12 among 44; there is no bias in the selection of these particular 12 drawings: they are the 12 
first ones in the collection.
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